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JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ICC AND THE
AFRICAN UNION - SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA
JACKY FUNG WAI NAM*
1. INTRODUCTION
Any fragmentation of jurisdiction has a deleterious effect on international
criminal law as it may create jurisdictional confusion, conflicts of laws, forum
shopping, and can ultimately lead to impunity for perpetrators. Recently, this
confusion was further aggravated when the South American Government refused
to extradite Omar Al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court ("ICC") upon
issuance of a South African Court Order and a warrant issued by the ICC in order
to preserve the relationship with the African Union ("AU").'
This paper discusses the fragmentation of jurisdiction of international
criminal law, and discusses the basic jurisdictional mechanism of the ICC and
African Court of Justice and Human Rights ("ACJHR").
In January 2013, a proposal ("ACJHR Draft Protocol") was submitted to
expand the jurisdiction of the ACJHR. Though the Draft Protocol has failed to
meet with widespread support of African States, it serves to pose a risk of
defunctionality of the ICC, as it adds confusion as to which entity-the ACJHR or
the ICC-is empowered to adjudicate international crimes. The ICC was intended
to be the final adjudicator for individual responsibility for international crimes in
the new era.2 Yet, this mandate will be diluted if the ACJHR's jurisdiction is
expanded to include international crimes.
The regional court system has always been chaotic in Africa. 3 Recently, the
ACJHR was established by the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights ("Protocol on the ACJHR"), 4 which was a merger of the
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1. Mehari Taddele Maru, Why South Africa Let Bashir Get Away, AL JAZEERA (15 Jun. 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/south-africa-bashir-I 50615102211840.html.
2. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON TIE
ROME STATUTE, 53, 425,440 (1 st ed. 2010).
3. See generally Marc Schulman, The African Court Of Justice And Human Rights: A Beacon Of
Hope Or A Dead,-End Odyssey?, 2 INKUNDLA (2013),
http://www.inkundlajoumal.org/sites/default/files/2013_lnkundla 2_0.pdf.
4. See Aft. Union, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
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African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR") 5 and the Court of Justice
of the African Union ("ACJ") 6. The ACHPR and the ACJ were replaced by the
ACJHR and the Protocol on the ACJHR became the single primary legal
instrument for the ACJHR.7
While the legality and the reputation of ACJHR are still being questioned by
commentators, 8 the African Union, in its January 2013 Summit of Assembly of
African Union Heads of State ("the AU Assembly"), considered expanding the
jurisdiction if the ACJHR to include criminal competence in the Draft Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights ("the Draft Protocol"). 9 The international crimes under the
expanded jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the
crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism,
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs,
trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and crimes
of aggression.' 0
The expansion of jurisdiction is under consideration. At its 2013 January
Summit, the AU Assembly asked the African Union Commission to consider
jurisdictional legitimacy and financial implications for the expanded power of the
ACJHR." Specifically, the African Union Commission was requested to
conduct a more thorough reflection... on the issue of popular
uprising... and on the appropriate mechanism capable of deciding the
legitimacy of such an uprising; . . . [and] to submit, a report on the
structural and financial implications.., from the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the African Court.. . to try international crimes .... 12
While it is impossible to predict whether the expansion of jurisdiction will
materialize, it is nonetheless beneficial to consider the potential relationship
between the ICC and the ACJHR if it is empowered with expanded criminal
jurisdiction. This is particularly relevant as most of the current ICC situations are
art.2, (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter Protocol on ACJHR],
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL STATUTE AFRICAN COURT JUSTICE-AND
-HUMAN RIGHTS.pdf (Protocol on ACJHR will be entered into force only after 30 days with 15
member states of the African Union ratifying it).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Ademola Abass, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and
Challenges, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 933, 934-35 (2013); see also, Schulman, supra note 3.
9. Afr. Union EX.CL/Dec.766 (XXII), 1, Decision on the Draft Protocol on Amendments to
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Jan. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Decision on Draft Protocol].
10. Afr. Union Specialized Technical Comm. on Just. and Legal Aff., Draft Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7, annex art. 28(a) (May 15, 2012) [hereinafter Draft Protocol on Amendments].
11. Decision on Draft Protocol, supra note 9.
12. Id. 2-3.
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in Africa. 13 This discussion will examine the jurisdictional basis of these two
important international courts.
This paper will first give an overview of the historical background of the
African regional court system. It will discuss the basic jurisdictional mechanism
of the ICC and the current ACJHR, as well as the proposed mechanism of the
latter. It will further discuss the conflict of laws between the Draft Protocol on the
ACJHR and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome
Statute") 14 and the possible consequences. Finally, it will provide possible
solutions calculated to resolve the dispute.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN REGIONAL COURT SYSTEM
In order to fully understand the current situation in Africa, it is necessary to
first understand the background of the African regional court system. For several
decades, the states in Africa have ratified different human rights treaties and
conventions.
The African Union is the successor of the Organization of the African Unity
("OAU"). The OAU was established on May 25, 1963 and was adopted by thirty-
two African States 15 with the following objectives:
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and
independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.' 6
Towards these ends, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
("African Charter") was adopted by the OAU and entered into force in 1986 with
ratifications from all fifty-three African member states.' 7 The African Charter
established the first complaint mechanism with the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, which required State Parties to provide self-reports on their
13. INT'L CRIM. CT., All Situations, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20ando20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited
Sept. 20, 2015).
14. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
15. DEP'T OF INT'L REL. AND COOPERATION FOR THE REP. OF S. AFR., Organization of African
Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU), http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/MultilateraVafrica/oau.htm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015).
16. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, art. 2, 111, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39; see
also id at pmble.
17. AFR. COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Ratification Table: African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (last visited Oct. 4,
2015).
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human rights status every two years. 18
In June 1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol on the ACHPR, which entered
into force in 2004, and established the first regional court in Africa, the African
Court of Human and Peoples' Rights.19 The role of the ACHPR is "to complement
and reinforce the functions of the [African] Commission in promoting and
protecting human and peoples' rights, freedoms and duties in African Union
Member States. The [African] Commission, being a quasi-judicial body, can only
make recommendations while the Court makes binding decisions."
20
In 1999, the Heads of State Assembly of the OAU issued the Sirte
Declaration, calling for the establishment of the AU.21 In 2000, The Lome Summit
adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union ("Constitutive Act"), which
specified the objectives, principles, and organs of the AU.22 Thereafter, the AU
was established in 2001 .23 The AU then adopted the Protocol on the African Court
of Justice ("ACJ") and it entered into force in 2009.24 The ACJ is the principal
judicial organ of the Union 25 with functions similar to that of the International
Court of Justice: to interpret the Constitutive Act, deal with questions relating to
international law, and to deal with disputes arising out of a breach of the
obligations of the treaties between State Parties to the AU.26
However, before the ACJ was established, the AU passed a motion in 2004 to
merge the ACHPR with the ACJ.27 The Protocol on the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights ("ACJHR") was adopted on July 1, 2008 and would only enter
into force thirty days after its ratification by fifteen member states. 28 As of
February 3, 2014, out of fifty-three member states of the AU, thirty have signed
18. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 62, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5
(Jun. 27, 1981).
19. AFR. CT. OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Frequently Asked Question, http://www.afican-
court.org/en/index.php/vacancies-3/frequent-questions#court-establishment (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
20. Id.
21. Org. of Afr. Unity EAHG/Drafl/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1, 8(i), Sirte Declaration (Sept. 9, 1999)
[hereinafter Sirte Declaration].
22. See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
[hereinafter Constitutive Act of the AU].
23. Id. See also U.N. ECON. COMMISSION FOR AFR., History & Background of Africa 's Regional
Integration Efforts, U.N., http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/history-background-africas-regional-
integration-efforts (last visited Dec. 8, 2015).
24. Afr. Union, Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (Jul. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union]; AFR. UNION, List of Countries Which Have
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union,
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%2on%2Statute%2of /2Othe%2OAfrican%2OCourt%20of
%20Justice%20and%20HR.pdf [hereinafter List of Countries].
25. Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, supra note 24 at art. 2, 2.
26. Id. at art. 19.
27. Aft. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V), Decision on the Merger of the African Court on Human
and Peoples'Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union-Assembly/A U/6(V) (July 4-5, 2005);
Afr. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (111) Rev.l, 4, Decision on the Seats of the African Union (July 6,
2004).
28. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at ch. II art. 9.
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the Protocol on the ACJHR but only five have ratified it.29 The five states are
Benin,30 Burkina Faso, 31 Congo 32 Libya,
33and Mali.34
Although only five states ratified the Protocol on the ACJHR, the importance
of the draft protocol extending court's jurisdiction is significant because out of
those five states, two are currently being prosecuted by the ICC (Libya and
Congo) 35 and one is currently being investigated (Mali)36 Moreover, the AU also
passed a motion to call on state parties to ratify the Protocol on ACJHR.37 Given
that thirty state parties have signed the protocol but not yet ratified, 31 it may
become part of the legal landscape in Africa in near future.
If the Protocol on ACJHR comes into force, it could result in a new way of
thinking about the relationship between international courts. Therefore, a
comparison of the jurisdictional triggering mechanism of the ICC and the proposed
mechanism under the Protocol of the ACJHR, with a particular emphasis on
jurisdictional superiority, will be fruitful.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE ICC AND THE DRAFT PROTOCOL OF THE ACJHR
There are four crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute:
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. 39
Moreover, there are three triggering mechanism in the ICC. Article 13 of Rome
Statute states that:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation... is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in
accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation... is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such
a crime in accordance with article 15.
Thus, the ICC may assume jurisdiction through state-referral, Security
Council referral, or the Prosecutor's exercise of his proprio motu powers.
29. List of Countries, supra note 24.
30. Id. (ratified June 28, 2012).
31. Id. (ratified June 23, 2010).
32. Id. (ratified Dec. 14, 2011).
33. Id. (ratified May 6, 2009).
34. Id. (ratified Aug. 13, 2009).
35. INT'L. CRIM. CT., supra note 13.
36. Id.
37. INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE, African Court No Substitute for ICC,
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/african-court-no-substitute-icc.
38. List of Countries, supra note 24.
39. Rome Statute, supra note 14; see also Int'l. Crim. Ct. Res. RC/Res. 6, at art. 15 bis 3 (Jun.
11, 2010) (The ICC will only exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression after 1 January 2017 if the
same majority of the Rome Statutes have adopted this amendment will be entered).
40. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13.
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Currently, the ICC has eight situations of which four are self-referrals (Mali,41
Uganda,42 Democratic Republic of Congo,43 and Central African Republic44). The
ICC may also exercise jurisdiction when the crime is committed on the territory of
a state party,45 or when the crime is committed by a national of a State Party on the
territory of a non-State Party.46 In case of a non-state party, the country can
voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of the ICC by declaration under Article 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. 47 The United Nations Security Council may also refer non-state
parties to the ICC
48
After referral to the ICC, the court will determine whether it satisfies the
conditions laid down under the complementarity regime (Article 17 of the Rome
Statute).49 Thus, the case will be inadmissible if the case "has been investigated"50
or "is being investigation" 51 or the person previously "has been tried ' 52 for the
same crime. 5 Additionally, the case will be inadmissible if the state party
concerned is willing54 and able55 to prosecute such case. Finally, the case will be
inadmissible if the offense is of insufficient gravity. 56 The ICC will only prosecute
when both the jurisdictional and the admissibility tests have been satisfied.
Article 98 of the Rome Statute also obliges the court not to proceed with a
request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested state to act
inconsistently with their obligations under international agreements 57 or
international law.5 8 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter also gives power to the Security
41. Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC-01//12-1, Decision Assigning the Situation in the
Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber 1I (Jul. 19, 2012).
42. Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July
2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005).
43. Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-02/04-1,Decision Assigning the Situation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber 1 (Jul. 5, 2004).
44. Situation in Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01, Decision Assigning the Situation in the
Central African Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber III (Jan. 19. 2005).
45. Rome Statute supra note 14, at 99 (This basis also provides jurisdiction to the ICC when the
crime is committed on board a vessel or aircraft where the place of registration is a State Party to the
Rome Statute).
46. Id.; see also Andreas Th. MUller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea
to Patient, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1273 (2010).
47. Rome Statute supra note 14, at art. 12.
48. Id. at art. 13(b).
49. Id.
50. Id. at art. 17(1)(b).
51. Id. at art. 17(l)(a).
52. Id. at art. 17(1)(c).
53. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the
Statute, 52 (May 30, 2011).
54. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17, 2.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at art. 96.
58. Id.
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Council to refer situations to the ICC, which overrides other treaty obligations. 59
Article 98 of the Rome Statute will pose problems if the Draft Protocol enters into
force by further confusing the jurisdictional priority of these two courts. 60
By contrast, the Draft Protocol and Protocol on ACJHR are more aggressive
than the Rome Statute. Article 28 of the Protocol on ACJHR defines the
jurisdiction of the ACJHR where it can exercise competence over legal disputes
relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act of the AU,
other AU Treaties, any legal instruments adopted by the OAU, and all human
rights instruments which the AU has adopted (including the African Charter, the
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa). 6' The ACJHR
can also exercise its jurisdiction relating to the interpretation of international law,
any decisions or acts handed down by the organs of the AU, any matters arising
out of agreements between the State Parties, any breach of obligation owed to a
State Party or the AU, and the extent of reparations of the breach of international
obligation.62 Arguably, Article 28 of the Protocol on the ACJHR and Article 4(h)
Constitutive Act of the AU legally obliges the ACJHR to expand its jurisdiction to
international crimes. 63 This is because Article 4(h) requires the AU "to
intervene.., in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore
peace and stability to the Member State of the [African] Union..." and Article 28
of the Protocol on the ACJHR requires the AU to attach itself to human rights
instruments. 64
Further, state parties to the Protocol on the ACJHR, the Assembly, the
Parliament, and organs of the AU, and any staff member of the AU can bring legal
disputes to the ACJHR.65 Also, the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, African intergovernmental organizations, or any non-governmental
organizations relating to the state party to the Protocol on the ACJHR can submit
cases to the ACJHR for violation of human rights guaranteed under the African
Charter, Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, or the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
59. U.N. Charter art. 41 (stating "The Security Council may decided what measures not involving
the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.").
60. Brett D. Schaefer & Steven Groves, The U.S. Should Not Join The International Criminal
Court, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-us-should-not-join-the-international-criminal-
court.
61. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at art. 28.
62. Id.
63. See Terefa Degu, Regional Systems in Pursuing International Criminal Justice: An
Examination of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, ABYSSINIALAW (June 17, 2015),
http://www.abyssinialaw.com/blog-posts/item/1506-regional-systems-in-pursuing-international-
criminal-justice.
64. Abass, supra note 8, at 937. See also Constitutive Act of the AU, supra note 22, at art. 4(h).
65. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at 19.
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Africa.66
The Draft Protocol proposes to extend the ACJHR's jurisdiction to
international crimes, including those four crimes triable at the ICC and other
serious international crimes.67 Moreover, it also calls for establishing an Office of
Prosecutor and a Peace and Security Council. 68 It provides the Office of
Prosecutor with powers to initiate investigation while the Peace and Security
Council is authorized to submit cases to the ACJHR.69 Moreover, the ACJHR
contains two additional triggering powers, similar to that of the ICC, which are
State Party Referral 7° and the exercise of the pro prio motu powers.71
The Draft Protocol allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
that occur in the territory of a State Party72 (operating on the territoriality principle),
crimes that occur on the vessel or aircraft of a State Party 73 (operating on the
territoriality principle), or the State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national74 (operating on the active nationality principle). Additionally, it assumes
jurisdiction over crimes where the victim is a national of a State Party 75 (operating
on the passive personality principle) or extraterritorial acts by non-nationals who
threaten a vital interest of a State Party 76 (operating on the protective principle).
IV. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL AND ROME
STATUTE
A. The Incompatibility of Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol
Both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol of the ACJHR are established
multilateral treaties, which are in conflict as the obligations under the Rome
Statute are incompatible to that of the Draft Protocol. This issue turns on the law
of termination and validity of treaties.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") regards the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") 77 as the customary international law in the
application of treaties. In the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project Case,78 the ICJ
stated clearly, in relation to issues of law relating to termination and validity of
treaties, that there is
66. Id. at art. 30(b), (d), (f).
67. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at annex art. 14 proposing to amend art. 28A,
11 -3.
68. Id. at annex art. 15.
69. ld at annex art. 15; Id. at annex art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46F, IT 2-3.
70. Id. at annex art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46F, 11.
71. ld at annex art. 46F, 13.
72. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, II 1-2(a).
73. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(a).
74. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(b).
75. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(c).
76. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(d).
77. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
78. Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Sept. 25).
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... no need to dwell upon the question of applicability in the present
case of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties. It needs
only to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to
hold that some of the rules laid down in that Convention might be
considered as a codification of existing customary law.
79
It has been opined that the customary character of the provisions of VCLT is
applicable to provisions relating to the validity and termination of treaties.80 The
only caveat is seen in the ICJ decision of Case Concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda)s l where the ICJ
found that Article 66 of the VCLT did not represent customary international law, 82
but is irrelevant to the instant inquiry.
According to Article 59 of the VCLT, a treaty is incompatible with another if
they relate to the "same subject-matter., 83 Article 59 does not deal directly with
incompatibility of treaties but provides guidance in situation for incompatible
treaties where a subsequent treaty is signed and the obligations of these two
treaties overlap. 4 The International Law Commission has interpreted Article 59 to
mean that the "terms relating to the same subject matter must be strictly interpreted
that that the two treaties shall only be considered as covering the same matter if
their object is identical and presents a comparable degree of generality."8 5
These criteria are applicable to the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol.
Preambles of both treaties share many similarities. For example, paragraph 16 of
the Preamble of the Draft Protocol states that "the present Protocol will
complement national, regional and continental bodies and institutions in preventing
serious and massive violations of human and people rights in keeping with Article
58 of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples Rights] and ensuring
accountability for them whenever they occur." 86 This is similar to paragraph 5 of
the Preamble of the Rome Statute which states that the objective of the ICC is to
"put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute
to the prevention of such crimes." 87 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of Draft
Protocol is also similar to paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute, where
79. Id. 46. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (S. Afr.) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. Rep. 16, 1 94 (June 21).
80. OLIVER CORTEN & PIERRE KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES - A
COMMENTARY 1237 (2011).
81. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Rwanda) 2006 I.C.J. 6 1 125 (Feb. 3).
82. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (4th ed. 2010).
83. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 59(1).
84. Id.
85. Francois Dubuisson, Article 59, in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, A
COMMENTARY 1336 (Olivier Coten & Peter Klein eds., 2011). See also Int'l Law Comm'n,
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, 229 - 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
86. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.
87. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at pmbl.
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they emphasize respect for human life and the importance of refraining from the
use of force.
88
In fact, the Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute shared more common
features than just the objective, such as the language in the criminal elements of
the four international crimes, 89 the exercise of jurisdiction for prosecution, 90 and
the mode of jurisdiction. 9' These similarities create conflicts arising from state
obligations for parties to both instruments. One common example of conflicts
would be when both the ICC and the ACJHR would prosecute the same person
(national of Country A) for the same conduct related to the same crime, and both
courts have asked Country B (a state party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft
Protocol) to surrender the respective suspect to their respective courts. Ultimately,
Country B can only choose one court to surrender the suspect, which would
inevitably violate their treaty's obligation under the other instrument.
The impact of this conflict between can be shown clearly with reference to the
following. Although only five states have ratified the Draft Protocol so far,92 the
AU has thirty-two states 93 that are state parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, the
Draft Protocol has a potential to significantly impact the functionality of the ICC.
If thirty-two states withdraw from the Rome Statute or give superior jurisdiction to
the Draft Protocol, the jurisdiction of the ICC in Africa will be functionally
eliminated. For example, Kenya has passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC in
their national assembly on September 5, 2013. 94 Although no law implementing
such withdrawal was made, this has already forced the ICC to re-consider the
motion to consider proposed amendments to address AU's member states
concerns. 
95
88. Draft Protocol'on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.; Rome Statute, supra note 14, at
pmbl.
89. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 14, proposing to amend arts. 28B-D, M;
see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, at arts. 6-8bis. (Draft Protocol basically mirrors the language in
the Rome Statute).
90. The entities eligible to exercise jurisdiction are prosecutors, state-party referral-which is
unique in Rome Statute-and United Nations Security Council, except that it is Peace and Security
Council of the AU in Draft Protocol. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 22,
proposing to amend art. 46F; see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13.
91. Both the Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute are complementary to national courts. Draft
Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46H; see also Rome Statute,
supra note 14, at art. 1.
92. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4.
93. Rome Statute, supra note 14 (The States are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape
Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote
d'lvoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe).
94. Gabriel Gatehouse, Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from ICC, BBC NEWS (Sep. 5, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23969316.
95. Judie Kaberia, Win for Africa as Kenya agenda enters ICC's Assembly, CAPITAL NEWS (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.capitalftn.co.ke/news/2013/ 1/win-for-africa-as-kenya-agenda-enters-icc-
assembly.
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This Draft Protocol creates an additional threat to the ICC as the ICC relies
mainly on the cooperation from state parties. Even states that wish to comply with
treaty obligations in good faith will be conflicted. The issue of who has superior
jurisdiction will inevitably arise.
B. Which instrument has superior jurisdiction?
1. Voluntary withdrawal
One way to resolve this conflict is by voluntary withdrawal. Article 127 of
the Rome Statute provides that State Parties can withdraw from the Rome Statute
by written notification one year from the date of the receipt of the notification.
96
To the contrary, both the Draft Protocol and the Protocol on ACJHR do not
provide any provisions regarding withdrawal of the treaty.
97
Article 54 of the VCLT provides that the party may expressly agree to
terminate any treaty.98 Article 54 of the VCLT states that:
The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take
place:
(a) In conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or
(b) At any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.99
Article 54(a) of the VCLT simply "serves as a reminder to the pacta sunt
servanda rule1 °° and affirms that this rule applies to the provision of the treaty
governing its termination or the withdrawal of a party." 101 On the other hand,
"Article 54(b) requires the fulfillment of two conditions to terminate a treaty or
allow a party to withdraw from it: first all parties must consent to the termination
or withdrawal; second, the other contracting States must be consulted."10 2
Under the current situation, because the Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty,
it is unlikely that all of the parties will terminate or withdraw from the Rome
Statute. This leaves countries that wish to withdraw from the Rome Statute the
option of exercising their rights under Article 54(a) of the VCLT and in
accordance with Article 127 of the Rome Statute.
However, not every state will make its stance clear. For those states that do
not withdraw from the Rome Statute, it may be implied that they intend the Rome
Statute to have superior jurisdiction. Yet, this creates ambiguity to jurisdictional
superiority. On the contrary, a mass withdrawal of State Parties to the Rome
Statute would seriously cripple the functionality of the ICC. After all, the
96. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127 1.
97. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10; Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4.
98. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 54.
99. Id.
100. S.E. Nahlik, The Grounds of Invalidity and Termination of Treaties, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 736,
746 (1971).
101. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1238.
102. Id.
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situations currently being pursued by the ICC are in Africa (with five out of seven
situations as self-referrals).10 3
2. Possibility of Auto-Termination of the Rome Statute
Assuming the States do not withdraw from Rome Statute and ratify the Draft
Protocol, this Draft Protocol will be ratified at a time later than the Rome Statute.
The later ratification triggers Article 59 of the VCLT, which provides for the
situation where the conclusion of a later treaty may impliedly terminate the earlier
treaty if the treaty obligations are in conflict.' 
04
Article 59 of the VCLT states that:
A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude
a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:
(a) It appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the
parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or
(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those
of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at
the same time.
10 5
Article 59 sets out a specific mode of termination or suspension of treaties:
the tacit abrogation or suspension of a treaty in the case of subsequently concluded
treaty. 106 This covers situations where all the parties to the treaty, without
expressly terminating or modifying an earlier treaty, must be considered to have
implicitly abrogated or suspended the first treaty because it was either the intention
of the parties to the treaty or the latter treaty is incompatible with the earlier one. 1
07
Nonetheless, Article 59 of the VCLT is not of much assistance regarding the
issue of conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol because it is
unlikely that all the parties in the Rome Statute would withdraw. Therefore, it is
impossible to automatically terminate the Rome Statute should the Draft Protocol
pass. However, Article 59 of the VCLT merely establishes measures based on the
general principles stated in Article 54 of the VCLT: the parties to a treaty are
competent to terminate it by the way of any subsequent agreement. 108 It is
commented that the purpose of Article 59 is "to respond to a particular situation of
103. Wenke Brickner & Angar Verma, In Troubled Waters: The International Criminal Court
(ICC), in GLOBAL TRENDs 2015, 101 (2015) http://www.global-trends.info/fileadmin/Globale-
Trends/beitraege kapitel/gt-2015 en.pdf.
104. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 59 1.
105. Id.
106. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1326.
107. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 9, at 203, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1 [hereinafter Report ILC, U.N. Doe. A/5509]; see also Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 252, U.N.
Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. I [hereinafter Report ILC, U.N. Doc. A/6309].
108. Richard Plender, The Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
133, 153 (1986).
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conflict between successive treaties ... it cannot cover problems of conflicts
between treaties, which imply the concurrent application of two treaties in
force."' 10 9 The interpretation of Article 59 is based on the rationale that "the States
concluding the second treaty are then fully competent to amend or annul the prior
treaty."' 10
Since it is only for parties intending to disregard their old agreement and enter
into a whole new agreement with the same parties to the earlier treaty, Article 59 is
not applicable here because the conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Draft
Protocol are more than mere modification. They are two separate treaties and the
ratification of Draft Protocol is in fact a breach of the treaty obligation to the Rome
Statute because the states ratifying the Draft Protocol would have taken away the
jurisdiction of the ICC. It cannot be said that "none of the parties' intention is to
have the first treaty incompatible with the second treaty."I'
From this perspective, this essentially raises "a question of the construction of
the two treaties in order to determine the extent of their incompatibility and the
intention of the parties.""12
3. Entering into the Draft Protocol may Result in a Breach of
International Law
It is a well-established principle that a country has the right of freely consent
to any treaty. 13 This is embraced by Article 34 of the VCLT, which states "[a]
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent." 114 This embodied the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
(agreements neither harm nor benefit third parties) and is founded on the principles
of sovereignty and independence of states. "
5
However, it does not mean a country shall neglect the treaty obligations they
have previously taken. Article 30 of the VCLT is applicable to parties who entered
into a treaty with conflicting obligations and do not want to actively withdraw
from their current treaty at the same time.
116
Article 30(4) of the VCLT is particularly relevant in this regard where it states
that:
(4) When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to
the earlier one:
(a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in
109. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1326; see also Sir H. Waldock (Special Rapporteur),
Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1 67 and Add.t-3 (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n I at 40.
110. Sir H. Waldock, supra note 109.
111. Report ILC, U.N. Doc. A/5509, supra note 107.
112. Id. at252-53.
113. VCLT, supra note 77, at pmbl (stating "the principles of free consent and of good faith.. .are
universally recognized..
114. Id. at art. 34.
115. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 5, 33 (Jul. 23).
116. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 888.
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paragraph 3;
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs
their mutual rights and obligations. "1
7
Article 30(4) of the VCLT and subsequent case law essentially gives a
solution for the Draft Protocol and Rome Statute to co-exist together."l 8 Before
further application of Article 30(4) of the VCLT, it is important to understand the
background and rationale establishing Article 30.
The general principle under international law is that states that have
contracted themselves to an earlier treaty cannot contract into another treaty that
has conflicting treaty obligations. This is the opinion laid down in many
international cases, such as the Honduras-Nicaragua case. 19 In the Honduras-
Nicaragua case, Nicaragua entered into a treaty with the United States, which
violated the prior treaty rights Nicaragua entered into with El Salvador and Costa
Rica. The Central American Court of Justice was careful in balancing the freedom
of the country to conclude a later treaty at their will with the prior treaty obligation
and stated that:
without competence to declare the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty to be null
and void, as in effect, the high party complainant requests it to do when
it prays that the Government of Nicaragua be enjoined "to abstain from
fulfilling the said Bryan-Chamorro Treaty". . .To declare absolutely the
nullity of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, or to grant the lesser prayer for
the injunction of abstention, would be equivalent to adjudging and
deciding respecting the rights of the other party signatory to the treaty,
without having heard that other party and without its having submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Court. 20
The Central American Court of Justice thus held that Nicaragua should avail
"itself of all possible means provided by international law to reestablish and
maintain the legal status that existed prior to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between
litigant Republics."'
' 21
In fact, the above court holding was well embodied in Article 26 of VCLT as
a maxim pacta sunt servanda-every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith. 122 Article 26 restates the pillar of
treaty law, and together with the principle of free consent and good faith, they form
the three basic concepts in VCLT. 123 This maxim is important in international law
117. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30, 14.
118. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 789.
119. El Salvador v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (Cent. Am. Ct. J. 1917).
120. Id. at 729.
121. Id.
122. OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (3rd. ed. 2012) 427.
123. Christina Binder, The Pacta Sunt Servanda Rule in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties: A Pillar and Its Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND
FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 317, 317-21 (Isabelle Buffard &
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because it often requires cooperation between states; breaching the trust could
result in high levels of mistrust between state parties. This rationale was upheld by
the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") in the Lotus Case while
balancing the principle of free consent and pacta sunt servanda:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a
view to the achievement of common aims. 
24
Thus, the freely given consent to be bound generates legal obligations
independent of any future changes in the sovereign will (ex consensu advenit
vinculum). 125 At the same time, many scholars also express the view that
prevailing consent-based theory, which is stated in the VCLT Preamble 3rd recital,
requires a preconditioned, legally binding rule that commands that treaties are to
be obeyed-pacta sunt servanda.126 In its famous Nuclear Tests judgment, the ICJ
interprets the terms 'good faith' to the very foundation of the pacta sunt servanda
principle:
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of
legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming
increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in
the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character
of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. 127
If a country enters into a treaty that concludes the same subject matter as the
previous one, the latter treaty is said to be tainted with illegality. This principle is
also reflected in Special Rapporteur Lauterpacht's comment during the
codification process of the VCLT where he stated that "if parties to a treaty bind
themselves to act in a manner which is a violation of the rights of a party under a
James Crawford ed., 2008).
124. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 1144 (Sep. 7).
125. Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/101 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956Add.1, at art. 4, 1 ("The foundation of treaty obligation is consent, coupled with
the fundamental principle of law that consent gives rise to obligation."); cf Edwin M. Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, V1, 36 YALE L.J. 1039, 1086 (1927) (stating that "[o]nly new
international law.., rests on consent or agreement to be bound, and even then probably only for a
comparatively restricted period would the unwilling state be able to deny the force of a rule generally
accepted."). Critics include Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L.R. 1 139-44 (1917)
(explaining that even though the state's previous consent establishes rules of international law, the
present will of the state should be put higher than any International law); Alfred Verdross, Le
Fondement Du Droit International, 16 Recueil des Cours 251, 265-66 (1927).
126. 1 JOST DELBRUCK, in DIE GRUNDLAGEN. DIE VOLKERRECHTSSUBJEKTE 37 (Georg Dahm, Jost
Delbruck & Rudiger Wolfrum 2nd. ed., 1988); see also THOMAs FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 187 (3rd. ed. 1990).
127. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20).
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pre-existing treaty, they commit a legal wrong which taints the subsequent treaty
with illegality."' 128 Under this view, the conflict of the treaty obligation caused the
invalidity of the subsequent treaty. 129 Similar rationales and decisions are echoed
in later cases in the PCIJ including the Oscar Chinn Case 130 and the case of the
European Commission of the Danube.13 1
However, the taint of a subsequent treaty does not necessarily invalidate it.
The subsequent treaty is invalid "only if the departure of the terms of the prior
treaty is such as to interfere seriously with the interests of the other parties to that
treaty or seriously impair the original purpose of the treaty."' 
32
This is particularly relevant to a multilateral treaty because of the plurality of
interests of states and it emphasizes the difference of invalidity and that of
application of treaty because "incompatibility with the provisions of a previous
treaty gives rise prima facie to a conflict of obligation, rather than, necessarily, to
the invalidity of the treaties." 133 However, the conflicting provision between the
Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute is the jurisdiction of the ICC. This is fatal to
the operation of the Draft Protocol because this constructively invalidates the Draft
Protocol's ability to function.
Therefore, freedom to consent is not unlimited and it has its obligations and
boundaries. By ratifying the Draft Protocol, the states will breach the obligation
owed under the Rome Statute and impair the function of the ICC. Professor
William Schabas commented that "[a]lready, the International Criminal Court is
the international justice institution that can make the most credible claim to a
demonstrable deterrent effect."' 34 Taking the freedom to consent to ratify the Draft
Protocol and not fulfilling the obligations to the Rome Statute will have
detrimental effect on fighting international crime. As such, it seems to satisfy the
standard set out by Lauterpacht and the later ratification may be invalidated
because it impairs the object and purpose of entering into the Rome Statute.
Furthermore, states are free to invoke Article 127 of the Rome Statue to opt
out from their treaty's obligation;' 35 failing to do so may give superior jurisdiction
to the ICC. 136 Mali is an example. Mali is a state party to the Rome Statute 137 and
it is also one of the five state parties to the Protocol on ACJHR. 138 Presumably, it
will also ratify the Draft Protocol. However, Mali has shown its intention to be
128. H. Lauterpacht (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63
(1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n I at 156.
129. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 772.
130. Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 80 (Dec. 12).
131. Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory
Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14, at 23 (Dec. 8).
132. Lauterpacht, supra note 127, at 93, 156.
133. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 773.
134. WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 44.
135. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
136. Seeid.
137. Id.
138. List of Countries, supra note 24, at 2.
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bound by the jurisdiction of the ICC since it has made a self-referral under the
Rome Statute. 139 Yet, invoking Article 127 may not mean the withdrawal from the
jurisdiction of the ICC because jurisprudence indicates the non-reciprocity of
human rights conventions, as will be discussed in further detail below.
4. Violations of the Non-Reciprocity of Human Rights Conventions
Cases and customs show that human rights conventions also have a special
status in international law-non-reciprocal obligations. Non-reciprocal obligations
"do not result in the exchange of direct, reciprocal benefits owed to the other States
Parties but in the performance of the treaty for the benefit of the community good,
which is tantamount to an 'immaterial' benefit of each State Party."' 140 This is
because, when dealing with Article 30 of the VCLT, the ICJ held in its Advisory
Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that:
In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely,
the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'tre
of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one
cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of
the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties.'
4 1
This holding is also reflected in Article 60(5) of the VCLT which states that
the termination of treaties due to breaches will not apply to human rights
conventions due to the protection of human persons contained in treatises of a
humanitarian character.'
42
The International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia also corroborates
this approach and held in Kupregkic case that:
The absolute nature of most obligations imposed by rules of
international humanitarian law reflects the progressive trend towards the
so-called "humanization" of international legal obligations, which refers
to the general erosion of the role of reciprocity in the application of
humanitarian law over the last century. [. ..] Unlike other international
norms, such as those of commercial treaties which can legitimately be
based on the protection of reciprocal interests of States, compliance with
humanitarian rules could not be made dependent on a reciprocal or
corresponding performance of these obligations by other States. This
139. Situation in the Republic of Mali, Case No. ICC-01/12-1, Decision Assigning the Situation in
the Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber I1 (July 19, 2012).
140. DORR & SCHMALENBACH, supra note 121 at 442; see also Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The
Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International
Responsibility, 13 EUR. J TNT. L. 1127 (2002).
141. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 23 (May 28).
142. VCLT, supra note 77.
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trend marks the translation into legal norms of the "categorical
imperative" formulated by Kant in the field of morals: one ought to
fulfill an obligation regardless of whether others comply with it or
disregard it.
143
Therefore, it may not be the practice of the ICC to give away suspects if the
ACJHR fails in fighting impunity because "no State Party to the Rome Statute
would be expected to negotiate an agreement with another government that would
facilitate a suspect's impunity from all forums of justice for the atrocity crimes that
the ICC is designed to investigate and prosecute ... Article 98 sets forth the
exceptions to the rule of surrender but it does not seek to deny the Rome Statute's
core purpose of fighting impunity."'14
Consequently, even if Article 98 of the Rome Statute is invoked in requesting
for the surrender of the suspect and if the ACJHR does not prosecute properly with
reference to the admissibility requirement laid down in Article 17(2) of the Rome
Statute or in compliance with international standards, the ICC can still assume the
jurisdiction, theoretically and legally, because it is distinguishable from a classic
situation under the Rome Statute Article 98.145
By the entering into the Draft Protocol, state parties are provided with an
additional option for forum shopping, which is contrary to the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute. There are at least three forums to conduct a trial: the ICC, the
ACJHR, and the national court of the state party. The framers of the Rome Statute
foresaw the risk of forum shopping when they put complementarity protections in
the treaty. 146 However, the ACJHR is not bound by complementary rules, only the
more general principles laid down in the VCLT.147 Assuming there is a sham trial
going on in the ACJHR by unjustified delay 148 or shielding of the accused, 149 this
second treaty entered into by the states will not be valid because this is a scheme
agreed between different states to seriously deviate from the original purpose of
the Rome Statute. 150 Forum shopping is, thus, incompatible with the objective of
ending impunity.
5. Resolution of the Dilemma
In the event the Draft Protocol is consistent with international norms, then it
143. Prosecutor v. Kupretkic, Case No. lT-95-16-T, Decision In The Trial Chamber, 1 518 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
144. David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent, 3 J. INT'L CT.
JUST. 333, 336 (2005).
145. See generally id. (explaining the purpose and situation contemplated under Article 98(1) and
Article 98(2)). See also Questions & Answers: U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements or So-called
"Article 98" Agreements, Coalition for the Int'l Crim. Ct., http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-
BIAsQ&Acurrent.pdf.
146. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
147. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 344-49; see generally VCLT supra note 77.
148. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
149. Id.
150. See VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
720 (2009).
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must be reconciled with the ICC's jurisdiction. Therefore, when dealing with the
Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol, the key is to find out what provisions in these
two treaties are incompatible and if they are dealing with the same subject matter.
The International Law Commission's study on Fragmentation in International Law
states "the test of whether two treaties deal with the 'same subject matter' is
resolved through the assessment of whether fulfillment of the obligation under one
treaty affects the fulfillment of the obligation of another."'' l This effect might
then take place either as strictly preventing the fulfillment of the other obligation
or undermining its object and purpose in one way or another. 152 It is proven in the
previous sections that both treaties' obligations are in conflict.
According to Article 30(4)(a), for states who are parties to both treaties under
this situation, it is opined that the two treaties co-exist to the extent that their
provisions are not incompatible with each other. 153 If the provisions cannot be
applied simultaneously, the earlier treaty will be terminated or suspended
according to Article 59 (lex posterior-rule).5 4 Article 30(4)(b) concerns situations
as between state parties to both treaties and a state party to only one of the
treaties.155 It provides that the treaty which both states are party to govern their
mutual rights and obligations.1
56
Therefore, according to article 30(4)(b), only one set of treaty obligation will
govern the situation at any given time. 57 The difficulty lies in Article 30(4)(a) and
in figuring out a method for both treaties to co-exist, especially under the current
complementarity regime of the ICC. Article 98 of the Rome Statute adds weight to
the difficulty because it obliges the ICC not to proceed with a request for surrender
or assistance that would require the requested state to act inconsistently with their
obligations under international agreements 158 or international law. 159 Assuming the
ICC applies Article 98 to the case, different situations can be set out to see what
may happen.
i. Situation 1:
Country A is party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Suspect
A is a national of country A. Suspect A flees to Country B where it is only party to
the Rome Statute. Under this situation, Country B only has the obligation to
surrender suspect A to the ICC (or to the national jurisdiction if there is an
extradition treaty under Article 98 of the Rome Statute and it passes the
151. Int'l Law Comm'n, on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the
diversification and expansion of International Law of Its Fifty-Eight Session, 254, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).
152. ld. 1253.
153. VILLIGER, supra note 149, at 406.
154. Id.
155. See VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30(4)(b).
156. Seeid.
157. Id.
158. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98(1).
159. Id. at art. 98(2).
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complementary requirement). If Country B were only a party to the Draft protocol,
then Country B would be obliged to surrender the suspect to the ACJHR (or their
national jurisdiction if they satisfy the complementarity requirement under the
Draft Protocol). 160
ii. Situation 2:
Country A is party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Suspect
A is a national of Country A. Suspect A flees to Country B, which is a party to the
Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Under this situation, Country B has to decide
who has priority to prosecute. Under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, Country B
has no choice but to surrender Suspect A to the ACJHR because Country B is
bound by international obligations to surrender the suspect under the Draft
Protocol (or to the national jurisdiction if there is an extradition treaty and the
national court satisfies the complementarity requirement under the Draft
Protocol). 161
iii. Situation 3:
Country A is only a party to the Rome Statute, but it is a member of the AU.
Suspect A is the national of Country A. Suspect A committed a relevant crime
within its own country and Country B. Country B is only a party to the Draft
Protocol. Under this situation, there will be concurrent jurisdiction because either
court has the absolute right over jurisdiction to prosecute: the ACJHR can operate
on the territoriality principle while the ICC can operate on the nationality principle.
At the same time, Country A is not bound by international obligation to surrender
the suspect to the ACJHR, thus Article 98 of the Rome Statute will not apply.
6. Concurrent Jurisdiction-Different Approaches to Solving the
Disputes
"The fact that there are different grounds of jurisdiction means that several
states have concurrent jurisdiction over a particular person or event."' 62 Situation
3 (above) illustrates the concept of concurrent jurisdiction. Currently, there is no
set of rules in international law to solve disputes over jurisdiction between
international courts. Judge Fitzmaurice stated in Barcelona Traction Case:
.. under present conditions, international law does not impose hard and
fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction .... It
does however.., involve for every State an obligation to exercise
moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by
its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more
appropriately exercisable by another State.
63
160. See VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30(4)(a).
161. See VCLT, supra note 141, art. 30(4)(b).
162. KACZOROWSKA, supra note 82, at 338.
163. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
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While international law does not provide much guidance on jurisdictional
disputes between international courts, one can draw reference to the different
approaches adopted by national courts.'64
There are several relevant principles in international law resolving disputes
between national courts for guidance, including genuine connection,
proportionality, and responsibility to protect.165 The ICJ stated in the Nottebohm
Case that the genuine connection requires "the legal bond of nationality accord
with the individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the
defence... 1 66 The rationale behind this principle is to require a significant nexus
between the regulated matter and the regulating organization. 167 This must be
discerned in order for that organization to be authorized to assert its jurisdiction. '
68
Proportionality is a legal principle or a "measure used to achieve an
objective.. .that is, properly related in size or degree to that objective." 69 This
principle may prohibit a state from asserting its jurisdiction over a situation, which
arises in another state, by using unjustified intervention, as proportionality requires
an interest-balancing exercise in a way that a state would not encroach upon the
interests of another state or to an extent that is disproportionate. 170 Proportionality
has been applied in the law of the World Trade Organization.171 Responsibility to
Protect is that "if a state 'manifestly' fails to protect its population, the
responsibility and authority to do so shifts to the international community."' 172 It
operates on a broader scope than humanitarian intervention 173 and encompasses
responsibility to prevent conflict, 174 to react to conflict, 175 and to rebuild after
conflict. 176 The Responsibility to Protect concept has been incorporated into
l.C.J. Rep. 3, 70. (Feb. 5) (separate opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.).
164. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annexed to U. N. Charter, 1945 I.C.J. 26, art.
38; see KACZOROWSKA, supra note 82, at 339.
165. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (2008).
166. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 23, (Apr. 6).
167. See id.
168. RYNGAERT, supra note 164, at 146.
169. Id. at 158
170. Id. (providing the example that proportionality can be "invoked in the law of war, which
prohibits States from mounting 'an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians.. which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipate.' It may also play a role in the field of countermeasures...").
171. Id.; Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 441(2001).
172. ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1
(2011). See also G.A. Res. 60/1 1 139 (Oct. 24, 2005).
173. Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, Address at the
John Vincent Memorial Lecture at Keele University (Feb. 26, 1993), in Int'l Aff., July 1993, at 429,
445 (stating that humanitarian intervention may be summed up as military intervention in a state,
without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death
among the inhabitants.).
174. See G.A. Res. 60/1 139 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to prevent
includes, amongst others, surveillance).
175. See G.A. Res. 60/1 140 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to react includes
the use of force).
176. See G.A. Res. 60/1 141 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to rebuild
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United Nations policy 177 and is central to the international community, focusing on
the preventive measure. 178 This is applicable to gross human rights violations and
courts can assume jurisdiction over internationally harmful activities originating in
their territory. 17 9 Thus, the United Nations Security Council can intervene (under
Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter) to protect at risk populations
when the states fails to protect. 180
In contrast, the approach adopted by United States' courts makes reference to
a reasonableness standard. The forum takes account of the different factors set out
in the U.S. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law to decide whether it
is reasonable for U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction in a particular case. The factors
include: (1) links of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (2) the
connections, such as the nationality; (3) residence or economic activity; (4) the
character of the activity to be regulated; (5) the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state; (6) the extent to which other states regulate such activities; (7) the
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
and (8) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.' 8' The
courts, even when reasonableness is satisfied, can reject jurisdiction on the grounds
of comity.
182
However, these jurisdictional bases have very limited application because
international courts have no "connections" in the conventional sense. Most
importantly, genuine connection and proportionality are impossible to eliminate
cases with jurisdictional competency because both the ICC and the ACJHR are
equally competent to exercise jurisdiction. The Responsibility to Protect has also
been criticized as an overly ambitious concept because its broad scope of operation
gives a legal basis for military adventurism. 183 At the same time, the U.S.
includes development assistance, administration, and punishment).
177. See generally RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2006) (discussing that responsibility to
protect is a central policy in the U.N. policy community). See also U.N. Secretary-General, Address to
the Summit of the Africa Union, (January 31, 2008),
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/lndex.asp?nid=2978 (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that he
would "spare no effort to operationalize the Responsibility to protect" and subsequently handed in a
report to the General Assembly on plans for implementing the Responsibility to Protect on Jan. 12,
2009, found in infra note 176).
178. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 1 18, U.N. Doc.
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (stating that "implementing the responsibility to protect will focus upon
prevention, capacity-building and assistance to states as the bases for implementing the responsibility to
protect concept.").
179. See id. at 11 0(b).
180. See U.N. Charter art. 41-42.
181. U.S. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §403(2)(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1987). See also U.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
182. See Laurittzen v. Larsen 345 U.S. 571, 582, 585-86 (1953).
183. See Ronda Hauben, The Justification to Wage War: Libya and U.N. Security Resolution 1973,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-justification-to-wage-war-libya-
and-un-security-resolution-1973/28230 (discussing that responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a "dangerous
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approach is unable to properly establish a system to filter out cases on
jurisdictional disputes between competing international courts.
Another more idealistic approach is that courts should "exercise their
jurisdiction with a view to furthering the interests of the international community
rather to advancing their own interests."' 84 It proposes that instead of relying on
the strongest nexus between the case and the forum, states should be entitled to
exercise subsidiary jurisdiction over persons and events in a situation where a state
with the strongest nexus fails to deal adequately with the case. 185 In fact, the Rome
Statute has been exercising this "subsidiary jurisdiction" if the national prosecution
is impartial or is not independent, or if the prosecution is shielding the accused, or
if the case has been delayed without justification.1 86 This "subsidiary jurisdiction"
is known as the complementary regime. 181 Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute
allows the ICC to exercise the jurisdiction if states fail to prosecute. 188 However,
even though the ACJHR did not fail to prosecute, the geographical location and
component of the ACJHR has already increased the possibility of bias and conflict
of interest to the trials conducted in ACJHR because they are connected to the
states in Africa. The relative lack of funding in the ACJHR is also a problem to its
establishment of the ACJHR, which would be difficult to provide an unbiased
forum for trials at the ACJHR. 8 9
Furthermore, Article 98 of the Rome Statute limits the authority of Article
17(2) because the state is constrained from sending the accused to the ICC if it is
bound by international agreement or law to send the accused to another state.
190
Thus, the result arising from the conflict of jurisdiction between the ACJHR and
the ICC is forum shopping.
As described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
The concern surrounding forum shopping stems from the fear that a
plaintiff will be able to determine the outcome of a case simply by
choosing the forum in which to bring the suit ... raising the fear that
applying the law sought by a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the
expectations of the defendant or will upset the policies of the state in
which the defendant acted (or from which the defendant hails)."' 9'
concept").
184. RYNGAERT, supra note 163, at 227.
185. Id.
186. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
187. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 344-49.
188. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
189. See generally International Monetary Fund, Report on the GDP by Continents, (Apr. 11,
2014), http://www.imf.org/extemal/country/index.htm (illustrating that African States has the lowest
GDP amongst Asia, Europe, North America and South America). See also Jon Silverman, Ten Years,
$900M, One Verdict, Does the 1CC cost too much?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946 (last visited on Oct. 6, 2015) (discussing that the 122
state parties to the ICC paid U.S.D. $140M over ten years for the operation at the ICC. Arguably, the
African States may lack the funding to establish a court that is unbiased and just for the accused).
190. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98.
191. Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 855 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Olmstead v. Anderson, 428
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Therefore, the accused may have the option to choose the most favorable
forum to try his own case if the Draft Protocol comes into force and this is
incompatible with the objective of international justice.' 92
Although this approach may not be practical, it nonetheless provides a
possible idea to allow the ICC to exercise "the subsidiary jurisdiction" if the
ACJHR fails to prosecute. However, all these jurisdictional bases have their
limitations. Nonetheless, by falling back on international law as discussed above,
the ACJHR may not be in conformity with international norms and may have a
difficulty in getting jurisdictional superiority.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol are incompatible because the Draft
Protocol fragments the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Draft Protocol satisfies the
standard of incompatibility because it has identical objectives and shares a
comparable degree of generality with the Rome Statute. This is shown in the
Preamble of the Draft Protocol and the Preamble of the Rome Statute where they
aim at ending impunity. 193 This is fatal to the function of the ICC in Africa
because all of the current situations in the ICC now are in Africa. It would greatly
impact the ICC.
Yet African States are free to enter into the Draft Protocol but this creates the
problem of jurisdictional superiority. One way to solve this dispute is by voluntary
withdrawal. The African States can withdraw from the Rome Statute by invoking
Article 127 of the Rome Statute in accordance with article 54 of the VCLT.
194
This paper also rejects the possibility of auto-termination of the Rome Statute
because it is unlikely that all the state parties to the Rome Statute withdraw from it.
However, this does not mean the withdrawal from the Rome Statute and the
subsequent ratification of the Draft Protocol is in conformity with international
norms. This may result in breaches of international norms, since Article 26 of the
VCLT requires the African States to perform treaty obligation with good faith
(pacta sunt servanda). 195 Performing treaty obligations with good faith is
important in international relations because breaching the trust will result in a high
level of distrust between different states. The freedom to consent also binds the
parties to the treaty that they have ratified. Therefore, entering into a treaty that
concludes the same subject matter as the previous one may taint the latter treaty
with illegality. Since the conflicting provision between the Draft Protocol and the
Rome Statute is jurisdictional, this constructively invalidates the Draft Protocol's
functionality. This conclusion is also implied by the fact that states are free to
Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1987)).
192. In most cases, the accused is the head of state; therefore if the country decides to prosecute the
accused and the prosecution is a sham, the underlying effect is that the accused may be able to forum
shop.
193. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.; Rome Statute, supra note 14, at
pmbl.
194. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127; VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 54.
195. VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 26.
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withdraw from the Rome Statute under Article 127; 196 failing to do so will create
ambiguity as to superior jurisdiction. Mali is the example here.
Further, the non-reciprocity of the human rights convention also bars the
African States from withdrawing. This is because human rights conventions do
not have an exchange of interests between state parties; it is for the interests of
human beings and the international community as a whole. Human rights run with
land and, once assumed, are irrevocable and cannot be removed under subsequent
instruments, treaties, or agreements. This is reflected in the Article 60(5) of the
VCLT and the Kupreskic case.'
97
Nonetheless, if states insist on entering into the Draft Protocol, Article 98 of
the Rome Statute would be the greatest bar for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
because it restricts states from sending the accused if there is a competing request
by international law or agreement. 198 This will result in forum shopping where the
accused can predict the outcome of the trial by selecting a favorable jurisdiction
for trial. This is incompatible with the objective to end impunity. Although the
ICC can distinguish Article 98 by the reason of forum shopping and invalidity of
the Draft Protocol (e.g. the ACJHR is merely used as a plan or scheme to delay
prosecution) from its usual application, the basis is debatable. Article 98 has
proven to be an obstacle for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction in other areas as
well, including head of state immunity and extradition agreement. 199 This has also
been proven to be an obstacle in the recent Omar Al-Bashir event in South Africa
where the South African Government refused to extradite Omar Al-Bashir.
2 °°
The next Review Conference for the Rome Statute is scheduled in 2017 .20,
The state parties to the Rome Statute should consider whether Article 98 of the
Rome Statue should be removed (perhaps making allowances for state parties to
make reservations to this change). Article 98 did not fulfill its purpose as
discussed during the negotiation 20 2 and did not provide any constructive function to
help fulfill the objective of the ICC. This has limited the ICC's jurisdiction.2 °3
Since Article 98 has lost its meaning and restrains the ICC from exercising
jurisdiction, Article 98 should be removed in the next amendment.
196. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127.
197. VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 60(5). See also Prosecutor v. Kupre~kic, supra note 143, at 11520.
198. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98(1)-(2).
199. See generally Dapo Akande, Head of State Immunity is a Part of State Immunity: A Response
to Jens Iverson, EJIL: TALK, http://www.ejiltalk.org/head-of-state-immunity-is-a-part-of-state-
immunity-a-response-to-jens-iverson (last visited on Oct. 4, 2015).
200. See Bill Corcoran, South African Government Loses Appeal Over Not Arresting Sudan
President, THE IRISH TIMES (Sep. 16, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/south-
african-govemment-loses-appeal-over-not-arresting-sudan-president- 1.2354106.
201. Coalition for International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod-review (last visited on Oct. 4, 2015).
202. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1037; see also David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on
the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); MARK D. KIELSGARD, RELUCTANT
ENGAGEMENT- U.S. POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 130 (2010).
203. KIELSGARD, supra note 194; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1038.
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The objective of the ICC is to end impunity, regardless of the forum. 2°4 If the
ACJHR is exercising its criminal jurisdiction with integrity while upholding
criminal justice, it should be encouraged. It is the reason why the ICC has adopted
the complementarity regime. The spirit of the preamble was explicitly reiterated
by former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, who observed that, "the absence of trials
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national
institutions, would be a major success. ' '20 5 However, if the ACJHR is a cynical
effort at forum shopping designed to allow impunity for crimes committed by
international leadership, it must be unmasked and the ICC must be allowed to carry
on its historical task. Hopefully, the establishment of the ACJHR will not be fatal
to the efforts of fighting international crimes and the objective to end impunity.
204. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at prmbl.
205. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampol6June03.pdf, (last
visited on Oct. 6, 2015).
VOL. 44:1
